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Abstract
This study investigated whether there is a discrepancy pertaining to trait and state academic emotions and whether selfconcept of ability moderates this discrepancy. A total of 225 secondary school students from two different countries
enrolled in grades 8 and 11 (German sample; n = 94) and grade 9 (Swiss sample; n = 131) participated. Students’ trait
academic emotions of enjoyment, pride, anger, and anxiety in mathematics were assessed with a self-report questionnaire,
whereas to assess their state academic emotions experience-sampling method was employed. The results revealed that
students’ scores on the trait assessment of emotions were generally higher than their scores on the state assessment.
Further, as expected, students’ academic self-concept in the domain of mathematics was shown to partly explain the
discrepancy between scores on trait and state emotions. Our results indicate that there is a belief-driven discrepancy
between what students think they feel (trait assessment) and what they really feel (state assessment). Implications with
regard to the assessment of self-reported emotions in future studies and practical implications for the school context are
discussed.
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learning strategies (for example self-regulated learning: [9]),
academic achievement [10,11], lifelong learning [12], and domain
and career choices [13]. Overall, beyond intelligence and domainspecific skills emotions have been consistently shown to be
important predictors of learning and achievement [14] and are
considered to be valued educational outcomes.
A number of disciplines in psychology investigates emotions and
uses various definitions of this multifarious construct [15].
Researchers working within the field of educational psychology
conceptualize emotions as comprising several components (e.g.,
[16,17]). These include the affective component (the core
‘‘feeling’’), the physiological component (heart rate, skin conductance, etc.), the cognitive component (thoughts related to the
emotion), the expressive component (facial expression, gestures
etc.), and the motivational component (for example, intention to
continue an activity). When investigating students’ emotions, most
of the studies rely on questionnaires to capture students’ academic
emotions ‘in general’, or habitual emotions (trait). Recently,
however, the focus of research has been shifting toward assessing
students’ state emotions in real-life context via the experiencesampling method [3]. The advantage of real-life assessments is in
their higher ecological validity [18] as study participants are asked
during their daily routines and not outside the context in question.

Introduction
Much of what we call emotion is nothing more nor less than a certain
kind–a biased, prejudiced, or strongly evaluative kind–of thought. But
emotions and behaviors significantly influence and affect thinking, just
as thinking significantly influences what we call emotions and behaviors.
([1]; p. 71)
The emotions that a student experiences whenever learning in
school is involved has become a growing area of research in
education and psychology and a focus of attention for scholars,
policy-makers, and the public. A number of special issues in
leading journals have been dedicated to the study of academic
emotions [2–6], and emotional and social skills have moved to the
center of current standards movements and legislation [7].
Further, a number of large-scale international assessments have
integrated emotions and related constructs into their programs
(e.g., PISA [8]). The increased interest in the study of emotions is
not surprising, as students’ affect has been shown to relate to a
wide range of important process and outcome variables in the
academic context and emotions are seen as important outcome
variables themselves. Variables related to emotions include
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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In line with this assumption, initial investigations consistently
reveal a discrepancy with regard to mean-level differences between
trait emotions, and emotions that are currently experienced, or
state emotions [19]. These theoretical developments coupled with
empirical findings call for further investigation of differences
between trait and state assessment methods.

are generally overestimated, as compared to state assessments [19].
The reported tendency for the individuals to rate trait emotions
higher makes scientists question trait assessments’ ecological
validity. The review of literature on emotions in educational
psychology, however, shows that there is a clear preponderance of
studies that employ trait-based emotional assessments. Critical
remarks about trait assessments considered, one may wonder why
trait measures are still used at all to assess emotions. In addition to
favorable economic considerations, with trait assessments being far
less costly than state assessments, various studies demonstrate that
traits are stronger predictors of future behavior and future choices
[24,28,29]. In the educational context these future choices could
represent domain and/or career choices [13,30]. Thus, the
aforementioned findings indicate that trait and state assessments
may not be used interchangeably and should be selected
depending on a research question that researchers are attempting
to answer [31]. The current study will provide additional evidence
and offer further insight into the discrepancy between trait and
state emotional assessments.

Assessing Trait and State Emotions: The Accessibility
Model of Emotional Self-report
One reason for the found discrepancy between trait and state
assessments of emotions may be attributable to the fact that trait
emotions seem to be more strongly influenced by semantic
knowledge than state emotions are. Robinson and Clore [19]
synthesize the findings with respect to the discrepancy between
trait and state emotional assessment and propose an accessibility
model of emotional self-report. The authors distinguish between
trait and state emotional self-reports by classifying them according
to the respective memory systems. Trait emotions are semantic,
conceptual, and decontextualized, whereas state emotions are
episodic, experiential, and contextual [19]. It is further suggested
that state emotions are directly assessed and thus influenced by
situational cues, whereas in trait assessments it is individuals’
beliefs and semantic knowledge (i.e., generalized knowledge about
which emotions should be experienced in certain situations) that
affect outcomes of the assessment. As a result, there is an expected
discrepancy between trait and state emotional assessments with
traits relating stronger to subjective beliefs.
A number of studies have examined mean-level differences
between trait- and state-based assessments of mood or emotions,
sometimes reporting inconsistent findings (i.e., trait ratings being
higher and lower than state ratings; e.g., [20,21]). However, the
vast majority of investigations show higher intensities of trait as
compared to state emotions [22–24]. This discrepancy between
trait and state emotional assessments has been termed intensity bias
[23] or impact bias [24].
The study of differences between trait and state self-reports has
not been limited to the area of emotions. Additional empirical
support for the discrepancy between trait and state self-reports
comes from a variety of branches of psychology with studies
investigating how semantic knowledge influences this discrepancy.
For example, one of the earlier studies revealed that recalled and
actual symptoms of women’s menstrual cycle significantly differed,
with women overestimating the severity of symptoms upon recall,
as compared to their real-time ratings [25]. The authors found
that the more female participants believed in the influence of
menstruation on well-being the more they overestimated their
recalled symptoms as compared to their state-rated symptoms.
Similarly, Porter et al. [26] investigated how assessment of trait
coping strategies was biased according to gender stereotypes
compared to momentary assessment of coping strategies. Another
example comes from van den Brink and colleagues’ study that
compared individuals’ recalled and diary ratings of the severity of
headaches [27]. In it, study participants reported higher intensity
and duration of their headaches in the retrospective assessment, as
compared to their ratings captured by diaries (real-time, state
assessments). The results of these studies are relatively consistent:
Trait assessments appear to be more strongly influenced by
subjective beliefs as compared to state assessments, with traits
being rated higher than states. Further, some studies provide initial
evidence that this discrepancy can be explained by subjective
theories that people hold.
These empirical findings indicate that trait emotions do not
appear to be a good indicator of actual state emotions. Trait
emotions are assumed to be influenced by subjective beliefs and
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Academic Self-concept as a Possible Moderator of the
Trait-state Discrepancy
Researchers have been trying to identify variables that may
explain the discrepancy between ratings of trait and state
emotions, and found subjective beliefs to be particularly relevant
[19]. For academic emotions, it is assumed that students’ selfconcept belief is an important moderating variable. The importance of self-concept can be inferred from Pekrun’s control-value
theory of achievement emotions [32], which stipulates that the
component of control, commonly represented by academic selfconcept, is one of the most prominent antecedents of academic
emotions. Academic self-concept represents an important control
belief in the school context and is defined as memory structure and
representation of the abilities and competencies a person has [33].
It has been shown to be positively associated with positive
emotions and negatively with negative emotions. Due to its
prominent role in academic emotions, self-concept belief should be
particularly effective in explaining the discrepancy between trait
and state emotional assessments in a way that this belief more
strongly influences trait emotional assessments but does not bias
state emotional assessments.
To our knowledge, there is only one study that investigated the
role of self-concept in explaining the discrepancy between trait and
state emotions [22]. This study examined gender differences in
trait and state mathematics anxiety and showed that despite
similar state mathematics anxiety ratings girls report higher trait
mathematics anxiety ratings as compared to boys. The discrepancy between trait and state mathematics anxiety in girls was
partly explained by girls’ lower self-concepts thus showing the
significant role that self-concept plays in clarifying existing
differences between the two approaches to assessment.
Several other studies investigated the influence of self-esteem, a
construct that is closely related to self-concept, on emotional
ratings. Robinson and Barrett [34] conducted three studies
examining links between self-esteem and emotional judgments.
The authors found that people with high self-esteem tended to
more positively rate their trait emotional experiences. State
emotional assessments, however, were found to be unrelated to
self-esteem. Another study showed that self-esteem influences
recall of emotional experiences in a way that high self-esteem more
strongly biases positive emotional recalls [35]. In sum, in line with
the accessibility model of emotional self-report [19] the results of
these studies found that trait reports were more strongly influenced
by semantic knowledge as compared to state self-reports. Further,
2
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self-concept and self-esteem were shown to be potential moderators of the discrepancy between the two approaches to emotional
assessment. The current study will attempt to further extend our
understanding of the role that self-concept plays in explaining
these trait-state differences.

Sample
Two samples were included in the current study. The first
sample consisted of N = 94 German students of grade 8 (54.8%,
Mage = 14.30 years, SD = 0.51; 24 males) and grade 11
(Mage = 17.57, SD = 0.58; 19 males) of 39 different classes (two to
three randomly chosen students per class) from the upper track of
the state school system in Germany (Gymnasium). The second
sample included N = 131 9th -graders from German-speaking
Switzerland enrolled in 41 classes (three to four randomly chosen
students per class; 44.3% male, Mage = 15.67 years, SD = 0.64).
Although Germany and Switzerland are neighboring countries,
there are several differences in their school systems that stem from
rather unique educational traditions. One major difference is that
students in Switzerland are separated according to ability tracks at
a later point in time (usually after six years as compared to four
years in Germany). Another notable difference has to do with the
class size, which is usually smaller in Switzerland.

Aims of the Present Study
The aim of this study was to compare students’ trait and state
emotional self-reports with respect to a possible discrepancy
between the two approaches. We also wanted to investigate
whether academic self-concept impacts the magnitude of the
discrepancy between self-reported trait and state emotions.
Based on the findings of prior empirical studies [22,23], we
expect to find a discrepancy between the rated intensity of trait
academic emotions and state academic emotions. We expect trait
emotions to be rated higher than state emotions (intensity bias;
Hypothesis 1). Beyond our attempt to replicate previous findings of
the intensity bias in the academic context, we intend to explain the
discrepancy between trait and state emotional assessments with
students’ academic self-concept. We expect self-concept to
positively predict the discrepancy between trait and state emotions
in positive emotions and negatively predict it in negative emotions
(Hypothesis 2). That is, as control positively relates to positive
emotions and negatively relates to negative emotions we expect
students’ self-concept beliefs to influence trait emotional assessments in the same direction.
Our study hypotheses were investigated in two samples from
two different countries. Four emotions were examined: Two
positive, activating emotions of enjoyment and pride, and two
negative, activating emotions of anger and anxiety. These were
chosen based on their high importance and frequently occurrence
in the school context [11]. We investigated our hypotheses in the
context of mathematics because several studies found that
academic emotions are organized in a domain-specific way
[36,37]. As mathematics is one major domain in the school
context, e.g., because of its importance for a wide range of
professions, we assume that this is a good starting point to
investigate the hypotheses.
To summarize, we were interested in examining differences
between students’ trait and state emotional assessments of
enjoyment, pride, anger, and anxiety in mathematics. We
expected trait emotions to be rated higher than their respective
state emotions. Furthermore, we investigated whether self-concept
of ability can explain this discrepancy between the two assessment
methods.

Procedure
Students’ trait emotions and self-concept in mathematics were
assessed via paper-and-pencil questionnaire that was administered
by trained experimenters. The same items were used in the
German and the Swiss sample. The procedure for the assessment
of students’ state emotions was highly similar in the German and
the Swiss sample and started right after the trait assessment. State
data were assessed by employing a computer-based experiencesampling method [38]. In the German sample two to three
randomly chosen students from each classroom were provided
with a personal digital assistant (PDA). In the Swiss sample three to
four students per classroom were provided with a PDA. The
participants were asked to activate PDAs at the beginning of every
mathematics class for a period of two regular school weeks in order
to ensure ecological validity of state assessments.
The PDA randomly signaled within 40 minutes from the start of
a lesson, prompting students to answer questions about their
momentary emotions during that specific class. Therefore, our
research design combines event-based and random sampling [18].
Students who took fewer than two assessments were excluded from
the analyses. In total, this procedure resulted in N = 415 state
measures with a mean number of 4.41 state assessments per
student in the German sample and N = 749 state measures with a
mean number of 5.72 state assessments per student in the Swiss
sample. As a reliability measure for our mean state data, we
calculated the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC(2); see [39]).
The ICC(2) ranged from 0.68 to 0.75 with anxiety having the
lowest and pride having the highest value (ICC(2) = 0.70 for
enjoyment; ICC(2) = 0.76 for pride; ICC(2) = 0.68 for anxiety;
ICC(2) = 0.70 for anger) suggesting acceptable reliability.
Assessment of trait emotions. In both samples single items
were used to assess the four trait emotions of enjoyment, pride,
anger, and anxiety: ‘How much [EMOTION] do you generally
experience during mathematics classes?’ The response format
consisted of a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree).
Assessment of state emotions. State emotions were assessed using single items for each of the four emotions [parallel
wording to trait assessment adjusted for the lesson: ‘How much
[EMOTION] are you experiencing during this class?’; see [22].
The decision to use single items was due to practical reasons (e.g.,
minimizing lesson disruptions) and to avoid unintentionally
evoking or changing emotions by the emotional assessment itself
[40]. By assessing emotions with single items we could not
explicitly assess the whole range of components of emotions (i.e.,
cognitive, motivational, etc.). However, we assume that our single

Methods
Ethics Statement
The procedures of both studies were in compliance with the
ethical standards (Ethical Principle of the WMA Declaration of
Helsinki) and were deemed appropriate by the Institutional
Review Board of the University of Konstanz. Participation in
both studies was voluntary. Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants in Germany and Switzerland.
Furthermore, parents of study participants were informed about
the nature of the study and its procedure, and the heads of schools
as well as mathematics teachers in both samples approved the
study protocol. Once the data were collected and entered, all
identifiers that could link individual participants to their results
were removed and destroyed. Hence, all the analyses were
conducted on anonymous data.
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interaction; c110). This interaction term represents the effect of
self-concept on the amount of difference between trait and state
emotion scores. Positive effects indicate that higher self-concept
values are associated with higher discrepancies between trait and
state assessments, whereas negative effects for the self-concept
variable indicate smaller discrepancies. For the sake of completeness, self-concept was also introduced into the model to predict the
intercept (c010). This ‘main effect’, which indicates the prediction
of state emotions by self-concept, however, was not of importance
in our hypotheses testing.
The mixed model regression equation for Model 1 (combined
model), used for each of the four emotions, is as follows:

items are still able to represent the five components of emotions
while maintaining satisfying reliability for the assessment of the
whole construct [41,42]. Responses ranged from strongly disagree to
strongly agree (5-point Likert scale). In the Swiss sample students
were asked to report emotions they are experiencing ‘right now’ as
compared to ‘during this class.’ This was the only difference in the
assessment between the two samples.
Assessment of self-concept. Similarly to trait emotions,
students’ academic self-concept was assessed via paper-and-pencil
questionnaire. Three items for academic self-concept were
adapted from the Self-Description Questionnaire (SDQ) [43].
Sample item includes: ‘I have always done well in mathematics.’.
The total score was calculated by taking an average of the three
self-concept items.

Yijk ½Emotion value i of student j in class k

Statistical Analysis

~c000 zc100 ðTraitÞzc010 ðzSelf {conceptÞ

The main focus of our analyses was on the discrepancy between
trait and state emotions and how this discrepancy is moderated by
self-concept. For that reason, we combined trait and state emotion
measures for each emotion into one variable and separated them
in our analyses by introducing a dummy called ‘‘Trait’’ with state
measures being coded as 0 (reference group) and trait measures
coded as 1. In our analyses, we did not report gender as a possible
moderator of the trait-state discrepancy. Significant gender
differences in trait mathematics anxiety but not in state
mathematics anxiety were found (as reported in the study of
Goetz et al. [22]). However, as gender differences in emotions
were not a major concern in the present study, we decided not to
include it in our analyses. As trait and state emotion measures are
nested within students, and students are nested within classes, our
data reflect a three-level structure with measurement points nested
within students and students nested within classes. Thus, the
analyses were conducted via multilevel statistics using HLM 6.08
(Hierarchical Linear Modeling [44]).
The advantages of the multilevel statistical approach, as
compared to other analytical strategies that have been used to
study differences between trait and state emotions (e.g., [35];
mean-level differences and moderator analysis) is that we can
account for the nested data structure (multiple measurement
points per person and persons nested within classes) and for
different numbers of measurement points per person (one trait
measure but different number of state measures per person). This
results in more adequate standard errors in statistical testing.
Furthermore, while using this intraindividual analysis (trait-state
discrepancy within each student), we assure that we do not commit
an ecological fallacy and draw conclusions on the wrong level of
analysis [45].
Level 1 variable. In order to test Hypothesis 1 (discrepancy
between trait and state emotional assessments; 0 = state, 1 = trait),
we introduced the Trait dummy into all of our hierarchical linear
regression models. Due to the coding of this variable, the intercept
evaluated as c000 describes the mean state emotion (i.e. the value if
all predictors are zero). The effect of the Trait dummy (c100) in our
models can be interpreted as an indicator of the discrepancy
between state and trait emotions. Significant positive effects of the
Trait dummy indicate significantly higher trait ratings as
compared to state ratings.
Level 2 variable. We further examined whether the discrepancy between trait and state assessments can be predicted by
students’ academic self-concept in mathematics (Hypothesis 2).
Therefore, we added self-concept as a z-standardized variable into
our multilevel analyses as a predictor of the slope of the Trait
dummy (slope-as-outcome model), which results in a cross-level
interaction between Level 1 and Level 2 (Trait 6 Self-concept
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

zc110 ðzSelf {concept  TraitÞzr0 zr1 ðTraitÞzu00 ze

Level 3 variable. In addition to the Trait dummy and the
self-concept variable, a dummy for either Switzerland
(CH_Dummy; German model, Model 2) or Germany (DE_Dummy; Swiss model, Model 3) was introduced on the third level
into the analyses to account for possible differences between the
two samples. The difference between the two samples may be
twofold. On the one hand, the samples were assessed in different
countries (Germany vs. Switzerland) and on the other hand,
slightly different instructions for state emotions assessment were
used (‘in this class’ vs. ‘right now’). Thus, we present our analyses
for the combined sample as well as for each of the two countries as
a reference group (including a dummy variable for the other
country, respectively). Coefficients for the interaction of each
variable with the respective country dummy (i.e. Trait 6
CH_Dummy, c101; Self-concept 6 CH_Dummy; c011; Trait 6
Self-concept 6 CH_Dummy; c111) indicate differences between
the effect for the country as compared to the reference group, e.g.
in the German model the dummy for Switzerland indicates
differences between the effect for the Swiss sample compared to
the German sample (reference group).
Hierarchical linear modeling, regression equations for Models 2
and 3.
Model 2– German model (German sample is reference group):

Yijk ½Emotion value i of student j in class k
~c000 zc100 ðTraitÞzc010 ðzSelf {conceptÞ
zc001 ðCH dummyÞzc110 ðzSelf {concept  TraitÞ
zc011 ðzSelf {concept  CH dummyÞ
zc101 ðTrait  CH dummyÞ
zc111 ðTrait  zSelf {concept  CH dummyÞ
zr0 zr1 ðTraitÞzu00 ze

Model 3– Swiss model (Swiss sample is reference group):
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–

1.27

1.00

1.27

SD

1.21
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–

1.51

2.04

2.12

M

2.71

zc001 ðDE dummyÞzc110 ðzSelf {concept  TraitÞ
zc011 ðzSelf {concept  DE dummyÞ

1.10

0.99

1.32

1.07

SD

1.12

zc101 ðTrait  DE dummyÞ
zc111 ðTrait  zSelf {concept  DE dummyÞ

3.09

1.63

2.64

2.35

M

2.51

zr0 zr1 ðTraitÞzu00 ze
Trait

Swiss sample (n = 131)

State

~c000 zc100 ðTraitÞzc010 ðzSelf {conceptÞ

–
–

The reliability of the self-concept scale was satisfying (German
sample: a = .91; Swiss sample: a = .86). Table 1 shows means and
standard deviations of variables for the combined sample and the
German and Swiss samples separately. As expected, trait ratings
are higher than state ratings for every emotion in both samples.
The only exception is that state enjoyment in the Swiss sample was
rated higher than trait enjoyment.

Hierarchical Linear Regression
The results of the hierarchical linear regression for the four
emotions of enjoyment, pride, anger, and anxiety are shown in Table 2.
Further, the variance components are depicted in this table. We
also calculated the explanatory power of self-concept with regard
to the slope variance, that is, as a predictor of the trait-state
discrepancy [46].
Model 1 – Combined model. In Model 1 the coefficient for
the intercept (c000) is to be interpreted as the mean emotion score
when all other variables in the model are equal to zero. Thus, this
represents the respective mean state emotion for a student who has
a mean self-concept. The mean state score for the emotion of
enjoyment was 2.52, 1.95 for pride, 1.97 for anger, and 1.50 for anxiety.
The coefficient for the Trait dummy (c100) is positive and
significant for every emotion with the exception of enjoyment, for
which no significant difference was found. Thus, with one
exception, trait emotions are rated higher than state emotions
(Hypothesis 1).
Regression weights for the Self-concept x Trait (c110) interaction
indicate the influence of self-concept on the discrepancy between
trait and state emotional assessments. As expected, for enjoyment
(.23) and pride (.30) the coefficients were positive, whereas for anger
(2.34) and anxiety (2.33) the coefficients were negative. This
suggests that high self-concept in mathematics is associated with
higher discrepancies between trait and state enjoyment and pride and
smaller discrepancies between trait and state anger and anxiety
(Hypothesis 2).
Models 2 and 3 – German model and Swiss model. In
order to account for differences between German and Swiss
samples, we calculated models for each of the four emotions with a
country dummy for Switzerland (CH_dummy; Model 2) and
Germany (DE_dummy; Model 3). With regard to our first
hypothesis, trait emotions were rated significantly higher than
state emotions. In the German model (Model 2), coefficients for
the Trait dummy (c100) were 0.42 for enjoyment, 1.02 for pride, 1.09
for anger, and 0.48 for anxiety. Coefficients in the Swiss model were

–
–
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092563.t001

1.15
3.03
Self-concept

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Descriptive Statistics

2.96

1.21

1.06
1.52
1.79
Anxiety

1.12

1.51

1.03

2.00

1.25

1.24
1.84

1.09
1.67

2.91

1.21

1.22

1.26
1.97

1.95

2.76
Anger

1.13
2.51
Pride

1.28

2.72

1.18

SD
M

2.20

SD

1.16
2.65

M
SD

1.27
2.52

M
SD

1.14

M

2.57
Enjoyment

Trait
State
Trait

State
German sample (n = 94)
Combined sample (N = 225)

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

1.30

Results
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Self-concept (c010)

6
0.419
0.174
20.269
0.034
0.022

Slope (L2) variance (t11)

Intercept-slope (L2) covariance (t01)

Intercept (L3) variance

Explanatory power
0.090

0.014

20.215

0.122

0.391

1.096

0.22

20.01

20.63***

0.46***

0.13

0.17**

0.42**

2.25***

20.22

0.01

0.63***

20.46***

0.35**

0.17*

20.22*

2.71***

0.261

0.059

20.320

0.252

0.460

0.924

0.30***

0.17**

0.56***

1.95***

0.369

0.051

20.234

0.128

0.429

0.916

0.08

20.07

20.80***

0.37**

0.28**

0.19*

1.02***

1.74***

Model 2

20.08

0.07

0.80***

20.37**

0.36**

0.12

0.22*

2.10***

Model 3

0.314

0.046

20.230

0.243

0.419

1.120

20.34***

20.14**

0.77***

1.97***

Model 1

Anger

0.357

0.042

20.196

0.173

0.404

1.118

20.01

0.12

20.55**

0.31*

20.32**

20.22**

1.09***

1.79***

Model 2

0.01

20.12

0.55**

20.31*

20.33**

20.10

0.54***

2.10***

Model 3

0.295

0.021

20.109

0.258

0.254

0.735

20.33***

20.11*

0.28**

1.50***

Model 1

Anxiety

0.332

0.020

20.104

0.217

0.255

0.735

0.17

20.04

20.36*

0.02

20.41***

20.09

0.48***

1.49***

Model 2

20.17

0.04

0.36*

20.02

20.24*

20.13

0.12

1.51***

Model 3

Model 1 = combined model; Model 2 = combined dataset with German sample as reference group; Model 3 = combined dataset with Swiss sample as reference group.
Description of variables: Trait = Trait dummy (0 = state, 1 = trait); CH_dummy = Swiss dummy (0 = German sample, 1 = Swiss sample); DE_dummy = German dummy (0 = Swiss sample, 1 = German sample).
German sample: NLevel 1 = 509; NLevel 2 = 94; NLevel 3 = 39; Swiss sample: NLevel 1 = 880; NLevel 2 = 131; NLevel 3 = 41.
Explanatory power refers to the proportion of slope variance explained by the Level 2 and Level 3 predictors. The slope variance of the models in which no cross-level interaction is included was: t11 = 0.178 for enjoyment in the
combined model and t11 = 0.134 in the German/Swiss model; t11 = 0.341 for pride in the combined model and t11 = 0.203 in the German/Swiss model; t11 = 0.354 for anger in the combined model and t11 = 0.269 in the German/
Swiss model; t11 = 0.366 for anxiety in the combined model and t11 = 0.325 in the German/Swiss model.
*p,.05,
**p,.01,
***p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092563.t002

1.103

Intercept (L2) variance (t00)

0.23*

Within-student (L1) variance ( 2)

Variance components

Trait 6 Self-concept 6/DE_dummy (c111)

Trait 6 Self-concept 6 CH_dummy/(c111)

Cross-level interactions L1–L2–L3

Self-concept 6 DE_dummy (c011)

Self-concept 6 CH_dummy (c011)

Cross-level interactions L2–L3

Trait 6 DE_dummy (c101)

Trait 6 CH_dummy (c101)

Cross-level interactions L1–L3

DE_dummy (c001)

CH_dummy (c001)

Level 3

Self-concept 6 Trait (c110)

Cross-level interactions L1–L2

0.19***

0.05

Level 2

2.52***

Intercept (c000)

Trait (c100)

Level 1

Model 1

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Pride

Enjoyment

Table 2. Predicting emotions: results from multilevel modeling.
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20.22 for enjoyment, 0.22 for pride, 0.54 for anger, and 0.12 (n.s.) for
anxiety. Hence, trait ratings were once again higher with the
exception of enjoyment in the Swiss sample. Here, unexpectedly, the
mean trait enjoyment was lower than the mean state enjoyment.
Further, the discrepancy between trait and state anxiety was not
significant in the Swiss sample. For each emotion, the discrepancy
between trait and state ratings was found to be significantly lower
in the Swiss sample (negative coefficient for Trait 6 CH_Dummy,
c101).
With regard to self-concept as a moderator of the discrepancy
between trait and state assessments, the coefficients for the Trait 6
Self-concept interaction (c110) were 0.13 for enjoyment (n.s.), 0.28 for
pride, 20.32 for anger, and 20.41 for anxiety in the German sample
(Model 2). In the Swiss sample (Model 3), the coefficients for the
Trait 6 Self-concept interaction (c110) were 0.35 for enjoyment, 0.36
for pride, 20.33 for anger, and 20.24 for anxiety. The strength of the
moderation effect of self-concept on the trait-state discrepancy did
not differ significantly between the two countries (all coefficients
for Trait 6 Self-concept 6 Country dummy (c111) were nonsignificant).

and therefore the possibility to predict mean trait emotions from
mean state emotions and vice versa. As trait emotions can be easily
gauged, an estimate of the extent to which trait emotions reflect
actual mean state emotions can be helpful, especially when more
costly state assessments are not available. When talking about
positive trait emotions, students with lower self-concepts seem to
have a more ‘realistic’ estimate of their trait emotions, when state
emotions are viewed as a benchmark for the ‘actual’ or ‘real’
emotions. The other way around, students with higher selfconcepts seem to less strongly overestimate their negative trait
emotions. Furthermore, it might be possible to find the selfconcept threshold where the intensity of the respective trait and
state emotion is estimated equally.
The explanatory power of self-concept in the prediction of the
discrepancy between trait and state emotional assessments was.02
for enjoyment and.26 for pride, .31 for anger, and.30 for anxiety
in the combined model. Overall, self-concept explained a
substantial amount of variance in the discrepancy between trait
and state assessments; however, it is only one of the beliefs which is
important with regard to academic emotions. According to
Pekrun’s control-value theory [32], value is another important
appraisal antecedent that relates to the subsequent emotions.
Intrinsic value reflects the value of an activity independent of the
results. The lower explanatory power of self-concept in the traitstate discrepancy for the emotion of enjoyment may be
attributable to the fact that enjoyment is one emotion, for which
value appraisal may be more important than self-concept appraisal
and thus, intrinsic value beliefs may be more predictive of the
discrepancy between trait and state.
Related to this idea is a possible explanation of the finding that
in the German sample, surprisingly, self-concept was not found to
significantly moderate the magnitude of the trait-state discrepancy
with enjoyment, even though the analyses comparing the two
samples from Germany and Switzerland showed that self-concept
was indeed a moderator with the other emotions studied. Thus,
one reason for this unexpected finding could be the aforementioned importance of intrinsic value beliefs with regard to
enjoyment. It is possible that value beliefs contribute much more
to the trait-state discrepancy for enjoyment than does self-concept.
Another difference between the two samples was that in the
Swiss sample average ratings of state enjoyment were higher than
average ratings of trait enjoyment. In general, the discrepancy
between trait and state emotional assessments was in all cases
stronger in the German sample. The reason for this difference may
be manifold. It is possible that cultural differences may lead to the
difference. Another explanation may come from the different state
item wording as enjoyment is a rather situation-specific emotion.
Thus, the wording ‘How do you feel right now’ may lead to a
stronger focus on the situation as compared to the specific math
lesson. Future studies should employ identical items to compare
results across samples and may use anchoring vignettes [47] when
assessing differences in emotion self-reports across different
countries.
To summarize, despite several unexpected results, our study
revealed quite consistent findings with trait emotions being rated
higher than state emotions and self-concept being a moderator of
the trait-state discrepancy.

Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether there is
a discrepancy between trait and state academic emotions, and
whether this discrepancy could be explained by students’ academic
self-concept. The results of our study revealed a significant
discrepancy between trait and state emotions in mathematics in a
way that trait emotions were generally rated higher than state
emotions with the exception of enjoyment and anxiety in the Swiss
sample. Thus, our hypothesis about the discrepancy between trait
and state mathematics emotions was generally supported (Hypothesis 1). This finding appears to be consistent with previous
studies that have demonstrated an intensity bias in the prediction,
recall, and evaluation of emotions in general [23,29]. Due to the
fact that we used parallel item formulations for trait and state
emotional assessments, directly comparing mean-level differences
was justified in our study. Despite the fact that both methods (i.e.,
trait and state) are routinely employed to assess students’ emotions,
they obviously index different aspects of this construct. Thus,
researchers and practitioners alike should refrain from drawing
conclusions from mean-levels in trait assessments to mean-levels in
state assessments and the other way around.
As predicted, self-concept moderated the magnitude of the
discrepancy between trait and state emotional assessments
(Hypothesis 2) with the exception of enjoyment in the German
sample. Specifically, students with lower self-concept tended to
more strongly overestimate their negative trait emotions (anger
and anxiety) as compared to their actual state emotions.
Conversely, students with higher self-concept tended to more
strongly overestimate their positive trait emotions (enjoyment and
pride) as compared to their actual state emotions in mathematics.
Overall, trait emotional assessments seem to be influenced by
subjective beliefs, and academic self-concept represents one of the
most important beliefs in school. Our finding that self-concept
moderates the magnitude of the difference between trait and state
emotions is consistent with the view that trait emotions are more
strongly biased by subjective beliefs and therefore capture beliefs
about emotions and not necessarily individuals’ immediate, or
state, emotions [19].
We just argued that it is not possible to draw conclusions from
mean trait emotions to mean state emotions. However, knowing
students’ academic self-concept should allow us to make a rough
estimate of the similarity of trait and state emotional assessments
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Limitations and Future Directions
Our sample is limited to the upper track of the school system
and only includes students from grade levels 8, 9, and 11. Future
research may downward or upward extend our study and explore
whether our findings generalize to students of different ages.
Further, we only investigated our hypotheses in one specific
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domain, namely the domain of mathematics. This is justified given
that academic emotions were found to be domain-specific with
regard to mean-level differences [36]. Future research could test
whether the findings of the present study generalize to other
academic disciplines, which we assume should be the case as
similar results were found in different contexts before [19].
Additionally, we only investigated the trait-state discrepancy
with the emotions of enjoyment, pride, anger, and anxiety. Future
research could include other emotions that are of high importance
in the learning and achievement context. For example, boredom
and relief are other relevant and frequently occurring emotions in
school [48,49]. Furthermore, it might also be relevant to
investigate whether there are stable differences in the trait-state
discrepancy for specific emotions. For example, in our study the
trait-state difference was stronger for some emotions than for
others. Examining possible reasons for these differences may help
to further understand how trait-state discrepancy emerges.
We also used two different wordings for the state items in the
two samples. Future studies should pay attention to the different
formulation of items and investigate how this perhaps results in
different outcomes, as manifested in larger or smaller discrepancies
between trait and state emotional assessments.
Finally, our study investigated self-concept as a moderator of the
trait-state discrepancy. As self-concept was shown to predict a
significant amount of variance in the discrepancy between trait
and state emotional assessments, it seems that self-concept is one of
the most important variables with a high explanatory power.
However, future studies may examine other possible moderators,
such as value (e.g., intrinsic value for enjoyment) or stereotypic
beliefs about emotions. It is possible that the effect of different
moderators on the trait-state discrepancy may vary depending on
the emotion being studied. For example, value beliefs could be
more important in one emotion (e.g., enjoyment) than in another
emotion (e.g., pride). Hence, investigating different combinations
of discrete emotions and variables that may serve as moderators of
trait-state discrepancy may prove to be a fruitful avenue for
research. Additionally, future studies may also test for self-concept
as a mediator of the relationship between emotional traits and
states. According to the control-value theory, control appraisals,
such as self-concept, are related to emotions, and feedback loops
between emotions and appraisals exist. Thus, it would be useful to
further investigate how state emotions contribute to the formation
of one’s academic self-concept and how academic self-concept, in
turn, influences one’s evaluation of trait emotions. That is, it would
be helpful to examine the role of self-concept as a mediator of the
relationship between emotional states and traits.
The results of the present study raise questions about the
ecological validity of trait assessments as they seem to be strongly
related to subjective beliefs and memory biases. In other words,
they are different from state emotions, which are more immediately assessed in classroom situations. We would like to encourage
researchers to differentiate between the two assessment methods
and bear in mind that they cannot be used interchangeably.
Hence, we implore investigators to choose one approach versus
the other depending on a research question. As a possible
limitation we would like to point out that state emotions assessed in
our study are still self-reported emotions and not ‘actual’ emotions
as it may be defined by neuropsychological or biopsychological
perspective [50].

Implications for Educational Practice
Explicating our findings from a practical perspective is
particularly important: Students’ emotional beliefs seem to have
strong impact on their future career choices more than their actual
emotions. As traits affect future behavior [29] and domain and
career choices in the school context [13], it is important to keep in
mind that subjective beliefs may influence these choices, too. This
may prevent students from proceeding careers in the respective
domain.
Thus, when one is interested in far-reaching consequences of
emotional beliefs, trait emotions are the assessment method one
should use. In this way possible interventions can be derived.
Students could be made aware of the possible discrepancy between
their actual emotions and what they think about their emotions
and how their beliefs may influence their career choices.
Encouraging them to check whether their beliefs are consistent
with their actual emotions can be a promising way to help students
to go into mathematics careers [22]. In order to change subjective
beliefs, cognitive interventions such as attributional retraining
seem promising [51–53]. By prompting students to closely monitor
their emotions we may help them to realize that they are not as
anxious or angry as they believe they are.
With regard to this, teachers play a key role and they could be
informed of the important influence of student self-concept on trait
emotions and therefore its possible effects on individuals’ domain
and career choices. From an intervention perspective, there are
multiple programs aimed at fostering students’ self-concept [54]. It
could be expected that a change in self-concept beliefs comes
along with changes in emotional beliefs and may therefore
contribute to basing future decisions on more realistic estimates
of how one feels.

Conclusion
The results of our study show that although trait and state
assessments are intended to gauge the same construct, they are
different. According to Robinson and Clore [19], state emotions
more strongly refer to actual emotions (episodic, experiential, and
contextual) whereas trait emotions refer to beliefs about emotions
(semantic, conceptual, and decontextualized). As Ellis [1] noted in
the initial quotation ‘‘[…] thinking significantly influences what we
call emotions […]’’ (p. 71) seems to hold true at least for trait
emotional assessments. This leads to the recommendation that
researchers should clearly differentiate between the two assessment
methods and assess emotions according to the main research
question. Further, we found that the discrepancy between trait and
state emotions is in part explained by students’ self-concept beliefs,
with higher self-concept being associated with a stronger
discrepancy of positive emotions and lower self-concept beliefs
being associated with overestimation of negative emotions each
compared to actual state emotions. In sum, it appears that what
students think they feel (trait assessment) is not necessarily what
they really feel (state assessment).
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